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SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION
This is an appeal in a criminal proceedings from a
Judgment and Order denying the Motion to Suppress entered by
the Sixth District Court in and for Sevier County, State of
Utah. Permission to appeal from the interlocutory order was
granted by this Court pursuant to Rule of 5 of the
Rules

of Appellate

Procedure.

Utah

There are no related or prior

appeals.

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW THE STANDARD OF
APPELLATE REVIEW WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY AND CITATIONS
1.
SHOULD LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS BE REQUIRED UNDER
THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION TO HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE OF A TRAFFIC VIOLATION
PRIOR TO STOPPING A VEHICLE?
Standard of review:

In Ornelas

v.

United

States,

96 C.D.O.S

3744, No. 95-5257 (U.S. Supreme Court May 28, 1996)the Court held
that questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make
a warrantless search should be reviewed de novo.

In considering a

motion to suppress, the Court reviews a trial court's underlying
factual findings under a "clearly erroneous" standard. State v.
Smith,

781 P.2d at 881; However, the Court reviews the trial

court's ultimate legal conclusions flowing from these factual
findings under a "correctness" standard. State
P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991; State v. Lope,

v. Steward,

806

831 P.2d 1040 (Utah

App. 1992).
Citation to Record: The Appellant's filed a Motion to
Suppress, see page 20 of the Record.

The Decision on the Motion

to Suppress is set forth on page 70 of the record and the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order page 77 of the
record.
2.
SHOULD THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE FOUND THAT THE
UNIQUE INVESTIGATORY TECHNIQUE OF STOPPING A VEHICLE BEFORE
DEVELOPING PROBABLE CAUSE OF A DRIVING PATTERN IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND DEVELOPED TO STOP THE OUT-OF-STATE
2

VEHICLE TO INVESTIGATE FOR POSSIBLE DRUG VIOLATIONS?
Standard of review:

In Ornelas

v.

United

States,

96 C.D.O.S

3744, No. 95-5257 (U.S. Supreme Court May 28, 1996)the Court held
that questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make
a warrantless search should be reviewed de novo.

In considering a

motion to suppress, the Court reviews a trial court's underlying
factual findings under a "clearly erroneous" standard. State
Smith,

v.

781 P.2d at 881/ However, the Court reviews the trial

court's ultimate legal conclusions flowing from these factual
findings under a "correctness" standard. State
P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991; State v. Lope,

v. Steward,

806

831 P.2d 1040 (Utah

App. 1992).
Citation to Record: The Appellant's filed a Motion to
Suppress, see page 20 of the Record.

The Decision on the Motion

to Suppress is set forth on page 70 of the record and the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order page 77 of the
record.
3. SHOULD THE LOWER COURT HAVE APPLIED "COMMUNITY
CARETAKER" LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO RANDOM STOPS MADE TO CHECK
POSSIBLE TIRED DRIVERS?
Standard of review: In considering a motion to suppress, the
Court reviews a trial court's underlying factual findings under a
"clearly erroneous" standard. State

v. Smith,

781 P.2d at 881;

Sierra, 754 P.2d at 974. However, we review the trial court's
ultimate legal conclusions flowing from these factual findings
3

under a "correctness" standard. State
215 (Utah App. 1991; State
1992). In Ornelas

v.

v. Lope,

United

States,

v. Steward,

806 P. 2d 213,

831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App.
96 C.D.O.S 3744, No. 95-5257

(U.S. Supreme Court May 28, 1996)the Court held that questions of
reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless
search should be reviewed de

novo.

Citation to Record: The Appellant's filed a Motion to
Suppress, see page 20 of the Record.

The Decision on the Motion

to Suppress is set forth on page 70 of the record and the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order page 77 of the
record.
4.
WERE THE DEFENDANTS UNLAWFULLY DETAINED AFTER THE DEPUTY
HANDED BACK THE DRIVERS LICENSE AND THEN ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN
CONSENT TO SEARCH?
Standard of review: In considering a motion to suppress, the
Court reviews a trial court's underlying factual findings under a
"clearly erroneous" standard. State

v. Smith,

781 P.2d at 881;

Sierra, 754 P.2d at 974. However, we review the trial court's
ultimate legal conclusions flowing from these factual findings
under a "correctness" standard. State
215 (Utah App. 1991/ State
1992). In Ornelas

v.

United

v. Lope,
States,

v. Steward,

806 P.2d 213,

831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App.
96 C.D.O.S 3744, No. 95-5257

(U.S. Supreme Court May 28, 1996)the Court held that questions of
reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless
4

search should be reviewed de novo.
Citation to Record: The Appellant's filed a Motion to
Suppress, see page 20 of the Record.

The Decision on the Motion

to Suppress is set forth on page 70 of the record and the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order page 77 of the
record.
5.
DID THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEPUTY WAS NOT
IN A POSITION TO DETECT THE ODOR OF MARIJUANA AND THE
OBJECTIVE FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT THE DEPUTIES SUBJECTIVE
ALLEGATION?
Standard of review: The Court reviews the trial court's
ultimate legal conclusions flowing from these factual findings
under a "correctness" standard. State

v. Steward,

806 P.2d 213,

215 (Utah App. 1991; State v. Lope,

831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App.

1992). In Ornelas

96 C.D.O.S 3744, No. 95-5257

v.

United

States,

(U.S. Supreme Court May 28, 1996)the Court held that questions of
reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless
search should be reviewed de

novo.

Citation to Record: The Appellant's filed a Motion to
Suppress, see page 20 of the Record.

The Decision on the Motion

to Suppress is set forth on page 70 of the record and the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order page 77 of the
record.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL
5

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 41-6-61.
Roadway divided
into marked lanes
Provisions
- Traffic-control
devices.
On a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for
traffic the following provisions apply:
(1) A vehicle shall be operated as nearly as practical entirely
within a single lane and may not be moved from the lane until the
operator has determined the movement can be made safely.
(2) On a roadway divided into three lanes... (n/a)
(3) Official traffic-control devices may be erected directing
specified traffic to use a designated lane or designating those
lanes to be used by traffic moving in a particular direction
regardless of the center of the roadway. Operators of vehicles
shall obey the directions of these devices.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 51; C. 1943, 57-7-128; L. 1949,
ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, § 18; 1978, ch. 33, § 14; 1987,
ch. 138, § 60.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 17-22-2. Sheriff

- General

duties.

(1) The sheriff shall:
(a) preserve the peace;
(b) make all lawful arrests;
(c) attend in person or by Deputy the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals when required or when the court is held within his
county, all courts of record, and court commissioner and referee
sessions held within his county, obey their lawful orders and
directions, and comply with the court security rule, Rule 3-414,
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration;
(d) attend county justice courts if the judge finds that the
matter before the court requires the sheriff's attendance for
security, transportation, and escort of jail prisoners in his
custody, or for the custody of jurors;
(e) command the aid of as many inhabitants of his county as he
considers necessary in the execution of these duties;
(f) take charge of and keep the county jail and the jail
prisoners;
(g) receive and safely keep all persons committed to his custody,
file and preserve the commitments of those persons, and record
the name, age, place of birth, and description of each person
committed;
(h) release on the record all attachments of real property when
the attachment he receives has been released or discharged;
(I) endorse on all process and notices the year, month, day,
6

-

hour, and minute of reception, and, upon payment of fees, issue a
certificate to the person delivering process or notice showing
the names of the parties, title of paper, and the time of
receipt;
(j) serve all process and notices as prescribed by law;
(k) if he makes service of process or notice, certify on the
process or notices the manner, time, and place of service, or, if
he fails to make service, certify the reason upon the process or
notice, and return them without delay;
(1) extinguish fires occurring in the undergrowth, trees, or
wooded areas on the public land within his county;
(m) perform as required by any contracts between the county and
private contractors for management, maintenance, operation, and
construction of county jails entered into under the authority of
Section 17-5-274; and
(n) perform any other duties that are required by law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal prosecution based upon a felony
information charging each Defendant with one count of Possession
of a Controlled Substance, more than one hundred pounds of
marijuana, a Felony Second Degree Felony in the Sixth District
Court in and for Sevier County, State of Utah.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Appellant's filed a Motion to Suppress (page 20 of the
Record) after the information was bound over for trial.

Prior to

trial, an evidentiary hearing was held on January 9, 1996 (a
transcript of the hearing is set forth at page 162 of the record)
The Trial Court issued a Decision denying the Motion to Suppress
is set forth on page 70 of the record and the Findings of Fact,

7

Conclusions of Law and Order page 77 of the record.
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW
The Defendant's pretrial Motion to Suppress Supported by
a Pretrial Memorandum and a Post-Hearing Memorandum.

The

Motion was denied by the Court in a written memorandum
decision and order and an Interlocutory Appeal was granted
by this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On June 8, 1995, at 6:50 a.m. in the morning, Sevier

County Deputy Sheriff Phil Barney parked his marked patrol
vehicle off the westbound lane on Interstate 70 in Sevier
County, Utah checking eastbound cars on radar.

(Transcript

of Hearing on Motion to Suppress of January, 9 1996,

Page

169)
2.

The Deputy observed a white passenger car coming

toward him around a curve in the eastbound lane of travel
and he testified that the car was in the right hand or "slow
lane" and allegedly crossed
or "fast" lane. (R.198)

the line once to the left-hand

The curve on the highway was a

right-hand curve and the direction the car moved out of the
lane is the same direction that the inertia of the vehicle
8

would tend to move the vehicle.

(R. 195)

The car was not

speeding and as the car came in close proximity to the
stationary patrol vehicle, the Deputy looked at the driver
to see if he appeared impaired and did not note anything
unusual about the occupants or the manner the car was being
operated. (R 198)

The Appellant's car was not interfering

with any other vehicles on the highway. (R. 196)

The

officer did not note any quick or erratic movement over and
back across the center line dividing the lanes of

the

highway and he described the movement as a smooth
transition, not "over and back." (R 196)

On cross-

examination, the Deputy stated that a car being driven by a
sleepy person usually makes an abrupt or quick movement back
into the lane and the movement he said that he observed was
"not an unusual comeback"(R. 219)
3. While pursing the vehicle, the Deputy did not note
any other unusual movement of the vehicle.

The operator of

the vehicle signaled when the car moved quickly moved off
the highway in response to the overhead lights of the
pursuing patrol vehicle. (R.198)

When the vehicle was

stopped, there was no problem with either the driver's
9

license or the registration.

No equipment violations such

as a broken window, license plate deficiencies or improper
registrations were observed by the Deputy.
4.

Deputy Barney has admitted that he does not normally

issue traffic citations for this type of lane travel
violation.

The Deputy would not have written a citation and

would have probably written a warning citation if this were
the only traffic problem observed. (R.194 of Preliminary
Hearing page 194)
5.

The Deputy testified that they specially assigned

him to the Interstate Highway system for the full eight
hours of his shift and no other Sheriff Deputies has such an
assignment (R.177) He testified that he has developed
special techniques for drug interdiction during traffic
investigations (R 177) Deputy Barney stated that the majority
of the persons that he arrested on Interstate 70 for drug
offenses are our-of-state persons and all of those arrests
started as traffic investigations(R. 179)
6.

Concerning driving under the influence and driving

while impaired investigations, Deputy Barney testified that
he does not follow a vehicle to develop a driving pattern,
10

acknowledging that other officers pull behind a vehicle and
follow the car for a period of time to develop a driving
pattern by observing how the vehicle travels down the
roadway.(R. 182)

He testified that one movement of a

vehicle across a lane line is a sufficient driving pattern
for him to stop the vehicle(R. 183)

The officer

acknowledged on cross-examination that other officer follow
the vehicle to determine a driving pattern which may
discount the initial observation as an indication of
impaired driving.(R.190)

Under his technique he pulls cars

over right away and when asked if he may be mistaken in
pulling a car over without a driving pattern stated:
[Answer]: Yes. I often pull people over that—that are
watching the scenery, that someone's getting a drink, and
they bob a little. (R. 190 and 191)
7.

The Deputy stated that he was sure that he pulled

over more cars than other officers because of his technique
of stopping immediately upon any possible sign of erratic
driving.(R. 191) He claimed that he did this because of an
incident where a vehicle rolled over while he was following
the vehicle and not because this was a technique to further
11

his drug investigations.(R. 191)
8. The Deputy acknowledged that the vehicles often make
unusual or erratic movements when they are traveling down
the Interstate freeway and observe a law enforcement patrol
car in a position monitoring the highway for possible
traffic violations. (R. 192) He testified that his vehicle
was visible in the median (R. 188) The Defendant Charles
Dion testified that he saw the

patrol car from

approximately one mile from the interchange and slowed his
vehicle and made adjustments to the vehicle speed because of
the Deputy Sheriff's presence.(R. 226) The Defendant
testified that the car may have moved slightly but that he
didn't cross the center line.
9.

(R. 226)

In relation to Appellant's stop, the Deputy

testified that as soon as the vehicle passed his position
that he turned on his overhead lights.(R. 200)

Immediately

prior to the stop, the officer was able to view the driver
as the car came close to his location in the median.(R. 198)
He said the driver was "staring straight ahead" (R. 199)
10.

After the stop, the officer was able to determine

very quickly that the driver did not appear to be impaired
12

or tired.

(R.201)

11. A review of the video tape made during the incident
indicates that the Deputy Sheriff did not place himself in a
position to be able to smell any odor coming from the
vehicle and he did not change that position during the
relevant portions of the traffic stop. (Exhibit 5) At the
Preliminary Hearing, the officer claimed that when the
driver rolled down the window while he was standing next to
the vehicle and there was a "gush of air" out of the
vehicle.(R.131) At the Motion to Suppress hearing, the
Deputy claimed that on the gush of air that he could smell
an odor of two or three substances, one of which was an a
vanilla odor and the other he described as "Cling Free"
laundry sheets.(R.204) The Deputy also said he could smell
the odor of raw marijuana upon his first contact with the
occupants.(R. 170)
12.

The Deputy obtained a driver's license from the

driver and walked back to his vehicle and ran a check of the
prior criminal history of the driver, Mr Dion, over the
radio in his patrol car.(R. 170)
indicate that at a information
13

Dispatch log records

request was made concerning

the driver, Mr. Dion. Both of the searches came back
negative. The Deputy Sheriff, even though he claimed to have
smelled an odor of marijuana, admitted that he did not
contact a back-up unit or request that dispatch send out
additional officers. (R. 208) The Deputy then walked back to
the car and gave the back the Driver's licenses and the car
rental contract.(R. 171)
13.

After handing back the documents, the Deputy then

asked the driver if he was carrying narcotics.

When the

driver denied that he was, the Deputy asked if he might look
in the car.(R.171) At that time the Mr. Dion told the
officer that he would prefer it if the officer did not
search.(R.171) The Deputy testified that the Driver's
hesitation made him suspicious(R.216)
14.

At that time the Deputy ordered both to step our

of the vehicle and ordered them to step to the rear of the
vehicle and began to search the car stating that the car
reeked of marijuana.(R.171)

A review of the video tape

shows that the Deputy began searching generally in and
around the front seat area of the vehicle and did not appear
to be following the scent of alleged marijuana. After
14

opening the trunk, 210 pounds of marijuana was found in the
trunk.

Until opened by the officer, the packages were

tightly wrapped and sealed.
15.

Charles Dion took the stand and testified that he

and the passenger had spent the night in a motel in southern
Utah and had only been traveling for an hour and a half when
he was pulled over.(R.221) He testified that he saw the
Deputy and was aware of the deputies presence.(R. 224)
16.

He testified that he rolled the window down prior

to the time the Deputy arrived next to his car.(R.227) He
along with the passenger had both been smoking cigarettes in
the vehicle.(R.230)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The arresting officer was parked in the median of the
Interstate Highway and testified that he saw a vehicle barley
cross the line and

drive in

the other eastbound lane as the car

drove around a curve toward his position.

He never observed any

pattern of driving and after the one brief observation drove his
vehicle through the median and immediately turned on his overhead
lights to effect a stop because of a possibility of impairment.
The Appellants submits the car in which the Appellant's were
riding should not have been stopped and should have been allowed
15

to drive on the Interstate without being arbitrarily stopped
without probable cause.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SHOULD LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS BE REQUIRED UNDER THE FOURTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
TO HAVE SUFFICIENT REASON TO STOP A VEHICLE FOR A TRAFFIC
VIOLATION?
A police officer's stop of a vehicle is a seizure and
the stop is subject to Fourth Amendment protection.
City

vs

Thorsness

Sandy

778 P.2d 1011 (Utah App. 1989) (defendant

not lawfully stopped for investigation of driving while
intoxicated where observed conduct was consistent with that
of normal driver),

State

v.

Lopez,

873 P.2d 1127 (Utah

1994) . The Fourth Amendment applies to investigatory stops
of vehicles "regardless of the reason for the stop or the
brevity of the detention." State
(Utah App. 1990)

v.

Talbot,

792 P.2d 489

In addition, the State bears the initial

burden for establishing the articulable factual basis for
the reasonable suspicion necessary to support an
investigative stop. State

v.

Delaney,

869 P.2d 4(Utah App.

1994).
In State

v. Lopez,

the Utah Supreme Court rejected the

"pretext stop" doctrine in favor of the rule of law articulated
16

in Terry

v.

Ohio,

U.S. 648 (1979)

392 U.S. 1 (1968) and Delaware

v.

Prouse,

440

The Court stated:

Our decision today should not be interpreted to mean that
evidence of an officer's subjective intent or departure from
standard police practice is never relevant to the determination
of Fourth Amendment claims... In this context, compliance with or
departure from police department procedures is particularly
relevant in determining whether an officer conducted the
inventory search pretextually.
Likewise, an officer's subjective suspicions unrelated to
the traffic violation for which he or she stops a defendant can
be used by defense counsel to show that the officer fabricated
the violation. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). The
more evidence that a detention was motivated by police suspicions
unrelated to the traffic offense, the less credible the officer's
assertion that the traffic offense occurred. If the trial court
finds no traffic violation, then the stop is not justified at its
inception and is therefore unconstitutional,
(emphasis added)
A stop is justified if there is a reasonable suspicion that
the defendant is involved in criminal activity. State

v.

Carpena,

714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (stating police must
base reasonable suspicion on objective facts indicating
defendant's criminal activity). While the required level of
suspicion is lower than the standard required for probable cause
to arrest, the same totality of facts and circumstances approach
is used to determine if there are sufficient "specific and
articulable facts" to support reasonable suspicion. Terry,

392

U.S. at 21.
In Terry,

392 U.S. at 21-22, the United States Supreme Court

stated that in as objective standard is important in assessing
17

the reasonableness of a stop, search or seizure under the Fourth
Amendment, and the Court stated:
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only
when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those
charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more
detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the
particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is
imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard
; would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the
seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief" that the action taken was appropriate? Anything less
would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights
based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a
result this Court has consistently refused to sanction.
(citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added)
A key issue presented by this appeal is whether the
observations of the Defendants' car by the Deputy warranted
immediate pursuit and the stopping of the vehicle for an alleged
traffic offense for the single movement between the two lanes of
eastbound travel and the Interstate Highway.

The Deputy observed

a car traveling through a curve in the road at the appropriate
speed and when confronted with a marked law enforcement patrol
vehicle the car may have momentarily driven across the lane
dividing line into the other lane which was not being used by
other vehicles.
The Appellants submit that the Deputy did not have an
objective reason to pursue and stop the car for a violation of
the traffic rules and regulations.
18

The vehicle could lawfully

travel in either lane and the applicable statute only requires
that the vehicle be driven "as nearly as practical" in the lane.
The applicable section, Utah Code Annotated

41-6-61(1953) states:

On a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked lanes
for traffic the following provisions apply:
(1) A vehicle shall be operated as nearly as practical
entirely within a single lane and may not be moved from the
lane until the operator has determined the movement can be
made safely.
(2) On a roadway divided into three lanes... (n/a)
(3) Official traffic-control devices may be erected
directing specified traffic to use a designated lane or
designating those lanes to be used by traffic moving in a
particular direction regardless of the center of the
roadway. Operators of vehicles shall obey the directions of
these devices.
In State

v. Bello

871 P.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1994), the

facts leading to suppression of a search and seizure by the
same Deputy were as follows:
On March 15, 1991, at approximately 11:15 a.m., Deputy
Phil Barney was traveling west on 1-7 0 when he noticed
Bello f s eastbound pickup truck temporarily drift so that it
straddled both eastbound lanes of traffic. Barney turned his
vehicle around, activated his video recorder, and pursued
the truck in order to stop it and determine whether the
driver of the vehicle was under the influence of alcohol,
drowsy, or otherwise impaired. For the approximately two
miles that Barney followed the truck, he observed no further
problems that might indicate an impaired driver, and he
stated at the hearing on the motion to suppress that there
were extreme wind conditions that day that might account for
the temporary drifting of the truck into the other lane....
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In Bello,

the State contended that when Bello's truck

briefly crossed the center line of the eastbound lanes, the
defendant violated a statute requiring that a vehicle be
operated "as nearly as practical entirely within a single
lane." Utah Code Ann.

41-6-61(1)

(1953).

Next, the State

argued that Bello's weaving provided Deputy Barney with
reasonable suspicion that Bello was driving while impaired
by drugs or alcohol.

This Court stated:

With respect to the argument that Bello could be
legitimately stopped for violating section 41-6-61(1), we
note that the statute requires only that a vehicle remain
entirely in a single lane "as nearly as practical." It was
extremely windy on the morning in question and Bello's truck
had a camper shell that caused it to catch the wind more
easily than other vehicles. These facts, in combination with
the fact that in the two miles that Barney followed Bello he
observed no further weaving, lead us to conclude that the
single instance of weaving seen by Barney could not
constitute a violation of section 41-6-61(1) and therefore
cannot serve as the constitutional basis for stopping
Bello's truck.
The State's second argument in justification of the stop
relies upon the existence of reasonable suspicion that Bello
was involved in criminal activity -- driving while under the
influence of drugs or alcohol. In determining whether
reasonable suspicion exists, this court looks to the
totality of the circumstances present at the time the
officer decided to stop the vehicle. Sierra,
754 P.2d at
975. The officer must be able to articulate facts and
inferences from these facts that would "'warrant a [person]
of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken
was appropriate. Anything less would invite intrusions upon
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more
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substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court
has consistently refused to sanction." State v.
Trujillo,
739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)).
This Court rejected the claim of reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity on the single incident of weaving
witnessed by Deputy Barney and held that in light of the
totality of circumstances the single incident of "weaving"
was inadequate to justify the traffic stop of Bello's
vehicle.

The Court found that the initial suspicion,

triggered by a minor driving aberration, was not
corroborated and Bello did not violate Utah Code Annotated
41-6-61(1) by weaving once in high winds, and did not
provide reasonable suspicion that Bello was driving under
the influence justifying the stop of Bello's vehicle.

The

Court stated:
As the Tenth Circuit recently noted, "If failure to
follow a perfect vector down the highway . . . were
sufficient reason to suspect a person of driving while
impaired, a substantial portion of the public would be
subject each day to an invasion of their privacy." United
States
v. Lyons, No. 93-4079, slip op. at 7 (10th Cir. Nov.
2, 1993)
In United

States

v.

Terry Lee,

No. 94-4199 (10th Cir

1996), the Tenth Circuit analyzed a stop by the same officer
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as follows:
Deputy Sheriff Phil Barney of the Sevier County
Sheriff's Office was operating a stationary radar on
Interstate 70 at the Sigurd, Utah, interchange at
approximately 7 a.m. on June 23, 1993. He was positioned
facing westbound in the center of the median. Deputy
Sheriff Barney observed a white Buick traveling eastbound
and straddling the lane marker as it approached. The
vehicle was directly in the center of the center line and
straddled it for about 100 to 150 feet (or for about one
second) before it proceeded into the outside lane of
traffic. Deputy Sheriff Barney observed that the driver of
the automobile was African-American and that the car had a
California license plate. He then immediately turned his
vehicle around and pursued the African-American driving the
Buick with out-of-state license plates.
Deputy Sheriff Barney testified that straddling the line
was not clearly a violation of the law, except for possibly
being an improper lane change for failure to signal. He
did, however, consider this conduct to be indicative of a
sleepy or intoxicated driver. His purported concern was
that the driver of the Buick with out-of-state license
plates might be sleepy or intoxicated. Deputy Sheriff
Barney saw no further driving irregularities as he pursued
and pulled over the driver of the Buick.
The Tenth Circuit Court stated:
While the stop in this case appears to be clearly
pretextual, our inquiry into the officer's justification is
severely limited by our recent decision in United States
v.
Botero-Ospina,
1995 WL 723102 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
Under Botero-Ospina, "[o]ur sole inquiry is whether this
particular officer had reasonable suspicion that this
particular motorist violated vany one of the multitude of
applicable traffic and equipment regulations' of the
jurisdiction."
The Court in Lee found that the "purported" concern that
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the Defendant with out-of-state license plates might be
sleepy or intoxicated because he had changed lanes is
sufficient to justify the stop under

Botero-Ospina.

However, the Court assumed that the lane movement was a
violation of Utah traffic laws or a reasonable suspicion of
impairment.
The Appellant's have through cross examination at the
Motion to Suppress Hearing proven that the officer would not
normally issue a citation for this type of lane travel.
Further, the evidence at the hearing established that the
trooper does not wait for evidence of a criminal violation
by a driving pattern and stops without further observations
on the road.

The Appellant submits that under the approach

of the Tenth Circuit, the State must prove an actual traffic
violation, not a possible violation before a vehicle would
be stopped by an officer conducting a traffic investgation.
Therefore, this Court should decide one brief movement
of a vehicle between travel lanes is a not a violation of
Utah traffic laws and not a reason to immediately stop a
vehicle to check for the safety of possible impaired or
tired drivers. As acknowledged at the hearing on the Motion
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to Suppress in testimony by the Sheriff's Deputy, other law
enforcement officers would have turned and followed the car
and upon determining that no driving problems existed would
have not stopped the car.
The Appellants submit that the Deputy Sheriff has
developed a procedure which allows him to patrol the
Interstate Highway and to randomly stop out of state
vehicles to search for controlled substances without actual
traffic violations.

Under the rationale of the State and

this Deputy Sheriff, any out of state motorist on the
interstate highway through Sevier County could be possibly
tired because they could hae driven from another state and
subject to being stopped for the slightest movement on the
highway or merely to check to see if they are tired. The
case presents objective evidence of investigatory
procedures, not the subjective evidence of the officers
intent.
The Deputy Sheriff's specialized manner of patrolling
the Interstate Highway in Sevier County while assigned to
traffic patrol allows him to make a substantial number of
arrests for drug offenses. As a usual course of events, the
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officer admittedly immediately pulls over vehicles on any
erratic movement instead of following the vehicle to
determine whether the brief erratic movement can be
discounted.

As a result, the Deputy Sheriff stops persons

before there is a driving pattern showing indication of an
impaired driver and before the law enforcement officer has
probable cause the driving is indication of a traffic
offense.
This technique differs from other traffic patrol law
enforcement officers and leads to drug arrests are out-ofstate residents. (as well as the suppression of evidence
based upon illegal procedures, see State
584, United States
1996),and,
In State

State
v.

v.
v.

Terry
Bello

Matison

v.

Matison

875 P.2d

Lee, No. 94-4199 (10th Cir
871 P.2d 584 (Ct.

App. 1994))

875 P.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1994), the

court noted that a stop is justified when the officer has
"reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is
committing a traffic offense, such as driving under the
influence of alcohol or driving without a license . . . [or
that] the driver is engaged in more serious criminal
activity, such as transporting drugs".
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The Court stated:

In the present case, Deputy Barney's stop of the vehicle
was not "fjustified at its inception.1" Lopez,
237 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 11. Defendant did not commit a traffic offense
immediately prior to being stopped. Deputy Barney had
earlier witnessed a vehicle fishtail, then drove to the area
where the incident had occurred and determined that it was
not the result of hazardous road conditions. However, he did
nothing more concerning the incident even though he was
aware of defendant's location; instead, he proceeded away
from the site of the incident. He later stopped defendant
only because, by mere happenstance, defendant was traveling
in the same direction as Deputy Barney.
An observation of one incident of movement across one
lane dividing line is not "weaving".

The phrase "weaving"

by definition must refer to a pattern of repeated erratic
lane changes.

The officer never observed any pattern of

driving and after one brief observation drove his vehicle
through the median and immediately turned on his overhead
lights to effect detention.
The Court should follow the analysis of State

v. Bello

as to

whether or not the vehicle should be stopped and not abandon
critical analysis of the reasons for the stop.

Under a critical

analysis, the Appellant submits that the State failed to prove
the stop not based upon objective evidence of a violation of
traffic law.

26

POINT II
SHOULD THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE FOUND THAT THE UNIQUE
INVESTIGATORY TECHNIQUE OF STOPPING A VEHICLE BEFORE
DEVELOPING PROBABLE CAUSE OF A DRIVING PATTERN IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND TECHNIQUE DEVELOPED TO STOP THE OUT-OFSTATE VEHICLE TO INVESTIGATE FOR POSSIBLE DRUG VIOLATIONS?
In Whren v.

United

States,

No. 95-5841 (June 10, 1996), the

United States Supreme Court held the temporary detention of a
motorist upon probable cause to believe that he has violated the
traffic laws does not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable seizures, even if a reasonable officer would
not have stopped the motorist absent some additional law
enforcement objective.

In Whren, the Petitioners claimed that

because the police may be tempted to use commonly occurring
traffic violations as means of investigating violations of other
laws, the Fourth Amendment test for traffic stops should be
whether a reasonable officer would have stopped the car for the
purpose of enforcing the traffic violation at issue. However,
the Court ruled that ulterior motives can invalidate police
conduct justified on the basis of probable cause and subjective
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis.
The Appellant's submit that the Whren decision supports
their position on appeal.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the

importance of requiring actual probable cause before law
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enforcement officers can intervene and conduct a roadside drug
investigation. Without probable cause, there should be no stop.
The district court should have found that the unique
investigatory technique of stopping a vehicle before
developing probable cause of a driving pattern is
unconstitutional.
The requirement of probable cause in stopping a vehicle
is important safeguard of Constitutional rights. Any
vehicle traveling down the road in a remote county could be
pulled over to

see if the driver is tired or impaired.

Such random stopping of vehicles is forbidden by the United
States Constitution.
POINT III
SHOULD THE LOWER COURT HAVE APPLIED "COMMUNITY
CARETAKER" LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO RANDOM STOPS MADE TO
CHECK POSSIBLE TIRED DRIVERS?
The technique of stopping a vehicle on the slightest
movement without a driving pattern differs from other
traffic patrol law enforcement officers.

Because this

technique the Deputy admittedly does not wait for probable
cause of Driving under the influence offense, the only
logical basis to stop a vehicle must based upon the deputies
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policy be as a community caretaker stopping possibly tired
drivers.
In order to prove that the vehicle was stopped for
public safety reasons, the Appellant's submit that the
Courts should require the State to prove that the Deputy
Sheriff had justification to stop vehicles under the
community caretakers' exception set forth in Provo City
Warden 844 P.2d 360 (Ct. App. 1992).

v.

Because Deputy

Sheriff Barney was purportedly acting to stop drivers that
maybe tired or possibly impaired prior to observing probable
cause of a traffic offense, the issue becomes whether the
law enforcement officer was authorized and required to make
"welfare" stops of citizens under these circumstances?
In Warden,

the Court adopted a three tiered test to

determine if a stop is reasonable and lawful under the
Fourth Amendment.

Under this analysis, a trial court must

evaluate the legitimacy of an alleged community caretaker
stop as follows: First, did a seizure occur under the Fourth
Amendment definition of that term?

Second, based upon an

objective analysis, was the seizure in pursuit of a bona
fide community caretaker function -- under the given
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circumstances, would a reasonable officer have stopped a
vehicle for a purpose consistent with community caretaker
functions?

Third, based upon an objective analysis, did the

circumstances demonstrate an imminent danger to life or
limb?

The exception requires circumstances threatening

life or safety, rather than using exigent situations as
merely a factor in a mix of considerations.

In Warden, the

court stated:
We also note that stops which are legitimate exercises
of police community caretaker responsibilities, but which
are not "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment, may result
in application of the exclusionary rule, while still
achieving the objectives of community caretaking. This
appears to be a legitimate means of encouraging genuine
police caretaking functions while deterring bogus or
pretextual police activities.
The evidence at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress
proved that Sheriff of Sevier County has authorized Deputy
Sheriff Barney to patrol the interstate highway system on a
full time basis.

Because of prior success in drug

investigations reasons, the Deputy is in a position to
monitor, stop and search out of state vehicles for
controlled substances investigations. While most vehicles
never stop in the County and are passing through on the
Interstate Highway system.

Deputy Sheriff Barney does not
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stop cars without a driving pattern because of public safety
or "courtesy" to see if they may be tired or impaired if a
vehicle crosses the lane dividing line just once, before any
pattern of vehicular movement is observed.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the Deputy
Sheriff acknowledged that he arrests an unusually high
number of persons traveling on the interstate system for
out-of-state for drug offenses using a technique which
results in mistakenly pulling over some motorists. Under his
technique he pulls cars over right away and when asked if he
may be mistaken in pulling a car over without a driving
pattern stated:

[Answer] : Yes. I often pull people over that— that are
watching the scenery, that someone's getting a drink, and
they bob a little.
(R. 190 and 191)
He stops out of state vehicles to investigate the occupants
for control substance violations and the State cannot
overcome the truth of this procedure by cloaking the
investigatory technique in purported concern for the welfare
of the traveling public. The Appellants submits the State did
not prove that the justification to stop was a community
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caretaker function.

Therefore, the Motion to Suppress should

have been granted.
POINT IV
WERE THE DEFENDANTS UNLAWFULLY DETAINED AFTER THE DEPUTY
HANDED BACK THE DRIVERS LICENSE AND THEN ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN
CONSENT TO SEARCH?
The Deputy Sheriff, even though he claimed to have
smelled an odor of marijuana, admitted that he did not
contact a back-up unit or request that dispatch send out
additional officers. (R. 208) The Deputy then walked back to
the car and gave the back the Driver's licenses and the car
rental contract.(R. 171)
After handing back the documents, the Deputy then asked
the driver if he was carrying narcotics.

When the driver

denied that he was, the Deputy asked if he might look in the
car.(R.171) At that time the Mr. Dion told the officer that
he would prefer it if the officer did not search.(R.171) The
Deputy testified that the Driver's hesitation made him
suspicious (R.216) A review of the video tape of the incident
does not support the subjective assertions of the Deputy.
(See Addendum)
The claim here is an initial odor of marijuana which
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resulted in de facto

arrest and removal of the occupants

from the vehicle and a warrantless search of the vehicle.
The video tape shows the Defendants being detained outside
of the vehicle and being ordered to place themselves in a
position not to view the search of the vehicle.

The Courts

have analyzed critically the stop of vehicles and a
warrantless search without consent based upon the subjective
United

odor of a controlled substance.

States

v. Nielsen

9

F.3d 1487 (10th Cir. 1993)(a police officer's alleged smell
of burnt marijuana was not probable cause to search the
trunk of the car, when there was no corroborating evidence
that defendant had recently smoked marijuana and no
marijuana was found in the vehicle)
In United

States

v. Lyons

7 F.D. 973 (10th Cir.

1993)the court found a stop illegal.

In that decision, the

Court noted the following facts:
While on routine patrol with another officer on 1-15 in
Juab County, Utah, Sergeant Paul Mangelson of the Utah
Highway Patrol was attracted to a pickup truck "by the way
this vehicle was being operated on the road." Following the
truck for approximately two miles, Sergeant Mangelson saw it
"weave" three to four times within its lane of the divided
highway. The two lanes in the truck's direction of travel
were sixteen to eighteen feet wide, and during the period of
Mangelsonfs observation the truck remained within its own
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lane.
Recalling that some drivers on this stretch of road came
from gambling in Las Vegas or Mesquite, Nevada, where they
had been drinking or had gone without sleep, Mangelson
decided to investigate further...
After initially obtaining defendant's driver's license,
however, Mangelson did nothing to determine whether Mr.
Lyons was impaired. He asked no questions about drinking or
lack of sleep; administered no roadside sobriety tests; did
not request the defendant submit to blood, breath, or urine
tests; and issued no citation for driving while impaired.
Moreover, he noticed no smell of alcohol on defendant's
breath and observed nothing about his person indicating he
was impaired in any way. Mangelson explained he did none of
these things because the situation "went from a suspected
DUI to a second degree felony. So there was no need to
pursue that."
He acknowledged in his experience "entirely innocent"
drivers would react to the presence of a police car by
"keeping their eyes on the road." He recognized that doing
so was not unusual. He agreed "very few" people drive on the
interstate without "some weaving" in their lane of traffic
and admitted that Defendant's "weaving" violated no Utah
law. He also conceded he was unable to articulate any
specific reason for believing Defendant was impaired and
merely relied upon his "sixth sense as an experienced
highway patrolman."
The Court stated:
We also believe Mangelson1s admissions concerning the
universality of drivers' "weaving" in their lanes and the
commonness of people's avoiding eye contact with police
officers while driving significantly undercut the
rationality of using these factors as objective reasons for
the legitimacy of the stop. Indeed, if failure to follow a
perfect vector down the highway or keeping one's eyes on the
road were sufficient reasons to suspect a person of driving
while impaired, a substantial portion of the public would be
subject each day to an invasion of their privacy.
The Court held that the stop was pretextual and the
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seizure that followed was tainted and should have been
suppressed.
In the United

States

vs.

Lee the government contended

that the search was valid because Deputy Barney obtained
consent from the Defendant.

The Court noted that an

encounter initiated by a traffic stop may not be deemed to
be consensual unless the driver's documents have been
returned to him, citing the case of United
Gonzalez-Lerma,

States

vs.

14 Fed. d. 1479 (Tenth Circuit, 1994) .

The

conviction of the Defendant in the Lee case were reversed
and the case remanded to the district court for dismissal of
the charges.
The Court should apply State v. Lopez,

873 P.2d 1127 (Utah

1994)because once a stop is made, the detention "'must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop.'" Id. at 1132 (quoting Florida
U.S. 491, 500 (1983)); see also State
763 (Utah 1991); State
(per curiam).

v. Deitman,

v. Johnson,

v. Royer,

805 P.2d 761,

739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987)

The officer claimed to be conducting a routine

traffic stop and requested a driver's license and vehicle
registration, conducted a computer check, and handed back the
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460

drivers license to the driver before inquiring about consent to
search.

The lower court should have granted the suppression on

the basis of this evidence.
POINT V
DID THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEPUTY WAS NOT IN A
POSITION TO DETECT THE ODOR OF MARIJUANA AND THE OBJECTIVE
FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT THE DEPUTIES SUBJECTIVE ALLEGATION?
The Appellants submit that the video tape of the stop
(See Addendum) and objective facts do not corroborate the
immediate detection by the officer of a strong odor of
marijuana sufficient enough to take custody of the
Defendants and search the vehicle without consent.

The

officer did not call for backup and returned his vehicle to
conduct a check for warrants. Then he returned and gave to
the driver his Driver's License and registration before
inquiring as to consent to search only after he was denied
consent were the Appellant's ordered out of the car.
The Courts have analyzed critically the stop of vehicles
and a warrantless search without consent based upon the
subjective odor of a controlled substance.
v.

Nielsen

United

States

9 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir. 1993) (a police officer's

alleged smell of burnt marijuana was not probable cause to
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search the trunk of the car, when there was no corroborating
evidence that defendant had recently smoked marijuana and no
marijuana was found in the vehicle)
The officer never positioned his body in close proximity
to the window(see addendum) In light of his own admissions
concerning multiple odors and the long delay before ordering
the defendant's out of the car, the State cannot prove
probable cause to search without a warrant and the Motion to
Suppress should be granted.

Therefore, the Court erred in

denying the Motion to Suppress.
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
In conclusion, the Court should reverse the denial
of the Motion to Suppress.

The Defendants should not have

been stopped and should have been allowed to drive on the
interstate without being arbitrarily stopped for a drug
investigation without probable cause of a violation of the
Traffic Code.

The Appellant requests the Court enter an order

reversing the denial of the Motion to Suppress.
DATED this

day of September, 1996.
RANDALL GAITHER
Attorney for the
Defendant-Appellants
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ADDENDUM
1. Video captures of Exhibit 5 introduced at the hearing of the
video tape of arrest of the Defendants.(Record page 203)
2.

Ruling of the District court.
MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed postage prepaid to:
CHRISTINE SOLTIS
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, #600
P. 0. BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114
DATED this

day of September, 1996.
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ADDENDUM
1. Video captures of Exhibit 5 introduced at the hearing of
thye video tape of arrest.(Record page 203)

DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SEVIER COUNTY
895 East 300 North, Richfield, Utah 8470*
Telephone (801) 896-2700, Facsimile (801) 896-8047

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
DECISION ON MOTION TO
SUPPRESS
vs.
Case number 951600159 and
951600158
CHARLES V. DION AND
JASON WOODS,
Judge David L. Mower
Defendant.

Defendants have made a Motion to suppress certain evidence that was seized from
them in this case. There have been two hearings, a hearing on their Motion to Suppress as
well as a preliminary examination. Based on the evidence presented at those two hearings,
the Court is sufficiently advised to allow it to make the following findings of fact:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Phil H. Barney is a deputy sheriff of Sevier County, Utah.

2.

The defendants are individuals.

3.

On or about June 8, 1995 the defendants were traveling eastbound on Interstate
Highway 70 (1-70) in Sevier County, Utah, traveling in a 1996 Mercury Cougar, which
is a sedan-type automobile.
96022Tl.se

State of Utah vs. Dion and Woods - 951600159 & 951600158
DECISION ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 2
4.

Deputy Barney was inside his patrol vehicle which was stationary and facing
westbound in the median of 1-70.

5.

1-70 is a freeway with two lanes for eastbound traffic and two for westbound.

6.

During daylight hours Deputy Barney saw the Eastbound Mercury driving such that it
straddled the lane divider line. To be more specific, Deputy Barney said that when he
observed the Mercury coming towards him around a curve it's left wheels were about
one foot across the lane divider line, and that the vehicle moved into the outside lane
before it passed his position.

7.

Deputy Barney made a U-turn, activated his overhead lights, and followed the Mercury
until it stopped after about one mile of travel.

8.

No other traffic violations were observed.

9.

Section 41-6-61(1), Utah Code, provides as follows:
A vehicle shall be operated as nearly as practical entirely within
a single lane and may not be moved from the lane until the
operator has determined the movement can be made safely.

10.

Deputy Barney has been in the presence of raw marijuana on many occasions in the
past and recognizes it's smell.

U.

Deputy Barney approached the Mercury and smelled marijuana.

12.

The driver rolled down the window. Deputy Barney smelled marijuana.
9602271.se
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Deputy Barney asked for drivers license and registration. The registered owner of the
vehicle was not present.

14.

Deputy Barney asked for consent to search, which was not given.

15.

Deputy Barney searched the vehicle without consent and without a search warrant. He
located 210 pounds of marijuana in the trunk.

16.

The weather conditions on June 8, 1995 were clear, calm and dry.

17.

Deputy Barney never saw the Mercury interfere with the driving or operation of any
other vehicle.
DECISION
The Motion to Suppress ought to be denied.
ANALYSIS
The State is not entitled to activate it's police powers and interrupt the travels of

citizens by stopping and thereby seizing their motor vehicles unless the traffic stop in
question was either (1) based upon a traffic violation committed in a policeman's presence, or
(2) because of specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom that
would lead a reasonable policeman to conclude that the occupant of the vehicle had
committed or was about to commit a crime.
It is a crime to operate a vehicle outside of a designated lane of travel. Section 41-69602271.se
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61(1), Utah Code.
It is true that under some circumstances it is not practical to operate one's vehicle
within the designated lane of travel. In fact, in the recent case of State v. Bello. 871 P.2d
584, the Utah Court of Appeals indicated that it may have been impractical for a driver who
was driving a pickup truck equipped with a camper shell to maintain proper lane travel under
high wind conditions. However, no such adverse driving conditions were present in this
case.
Violation of the lane-travel statute shows that the driver could be impaired, such as
by drowsiness or by the ingestion of some type of chemical. It is a crime to drive while
impaired. Section 41-6-44, Utah Code, prohibits driving while under the influence of alcohol,
drugs, or a combination of the two; Section 41-6-46 prohibits driving at a speed too fast for
existing conditions (it would be a violation of this statute to drive a vehicle at any speed if
the driver were in the condition of being asleep); Section 41-6-45 prohibits reckless driving,
which would also apply to sleepy drivers.
The officer observed a crime. He had probable cause to stop the Mercury. He
smelled marijuana. He had probable cause to search for and seize it without a warrant
because it was in a movable automobile, whose occupants were alerted. State v. Larocco. 794
P.2d 460 (Utah Supreme Court., 1990).
9602271.se
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CONCLUSION
The Motion to Suppress ought to be denied. Mr. Brown is directed to prepare an
appropriate order and to submit it for execution by following the procedure set forth in Rule
4-504, Code of Judicial Administration.

Signed on March

if
/ *

, 1996

mui

David L. Mower, Judge
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Salt Lake City, UT 84102

^SJS'/SI.*

96022Tl.se

